Hind Sight 9/11 NYT

Posted by: KateSorensen

Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/10/12 10:09 PM

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Hind Sight from the NYT click link

The Deafness Before the Storm
By KURT EICHENWALD

IT was perhaps the most famous presidential briefing in history.

On Aug. 6, 2001, President George W. Bush received a classified review of the threats posed by Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network, Al Qaeda. That morning’s “presidential daily brief” — the top-secret document prepared by America’s intelligence agencies — featured the now-infamous heading: “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” A few weeks later, on 9/11, Al Qaeda accomplished that goal.

On April 10, 2004, the Bush White House declassified that daily brief — and only that daily brief — in response to pressure from the 9/11 Commission, which was investigating the events leading to the attack. Administration officials dismissed the document’s significance, saying that, despite the jaw-dropping headline, it was only an assessment of Al Qaeda’s history, not a warning of the impending attack. While some critics considered that claim absurd, a close reading of the brief showed that the argument had some validity.

That is, unless it was read in conjunction with the daily briefs preceding Aug. 6, the ones the Bush administration would not release. While those documents are still not public, I have read excerpts from many of them, along with other recently declassified records, and come to an inescapable conclusion: the administration’s reaction to what Mr. Bush was told in the weeks before that infamous briefing reflected significantly more negligence than has been disclosed. In other words, the Aug. 6 document, for all of the controversy it provoked, is not nearly as shocking as the briefs that came before it.

The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that Qaeda strikes could be “imminent,” although intelligence suggested the time frame was flexible.

But some in the administration considered the warning to be just bluster. An intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration both told me in interviews that the neoconservative leaders who had recently assumed power at the Pentagon were warning the White House that the C.I.A. had been fooled; according to this theory, Bin Laden was merely pretending to be planning an attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, whom the neoconservatives saw as a greater threat. Intelligence officials, these sources said, protested that the idea of Bin Laden, an Islamic fundamentalist, conspiring with Mr. Hussein, an Iraqi secularist, was ridiculous, but the neoconservatives’ suspicions were nevertheless carrying the day.

In response, the C.I.A. prepared an analysis that all but pleaded with the White House to accept that the danger from Bin Laden was real.

“The U.S. is not the target of a disinformation campaign by Usama Bin Laden,” the daily brief of June 29 read, using the government’s transliteration of Bin Laden’s first name. Going on for more than a page, the document recited much of the evidence, including an interview that month with a Middle Eastern journalist in which Bin Laden aides warned of a coming attack, as well as competitive pressures that the terrorist leader was feeling, given the number of Islamists being recruited for the separatist Russian region of Chechnya.

And the C.I.A. repeated the warnings in the briefs that followed. Operatives connected to Bin Laden, one reported on June 29, expected the planned near-term attacks to have “dramatic consequences,” including major casualties. On July 1, the brief stated that the operation had been delayed, but “will occur soon.” Some of the briefs again reminded Mr. Bush that the attack timing was flexible, and that, despite any perceived delay, the planned assault was on track.

Yet, the White House failed to take significant action. Officials at the Counterterrorism Center of the C.I.A. grew apoplectic. On July 9, at a meeting of the counterterrorism group, one official suggested that the staff put in for a transfer so that somebody else would be responsible when the attack took place, two people who were there told me in interviews. The suggestion was batted down, they said, because there would be no time to train anyone else.

That same day in Chechnya, according to intelligence I reviewed, Ibn Al-Khattab, an extremist who was known for his brutality and his links to Al Qaeda, told his followers that there would soon be very big news. Within 48 hours, an intelligence official told me, that information was conveyed to the White House, providing more data supporting the C.I.A.’s warnings. Still, the alarm bells didn’t sound.

On July 24, Mr. Bush was notified that the attack was still being readied, but that it had been postponed, perhaps by a few months. But the president did not feel the briefings on potential attacks were sufficient, one intelligence official told me, and instead asked for a broader analysis on Al Qaeda, its aspirations and its history. In response, the C.I.A. set to work on the Aug. 6 brief.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush officials attempted to deflect criticism that they had ignored C.I.A. warnings by saying they had not been told when and where the attack would occur. That is true, as far as it goes, but it misses the point. Throughout that summer, there were events that might have exposed the plans, had the government been on high alert. Indeed, even as the Aug. 6 brief was being prepared, Mohamed al-Kahtani, a Saudi believed to have been assigned a role in the 9/11 attacks, was stopped at an airport in Orlando, Fla., by a suspicious customs agent and sent back overseas on Aug. 4. Two weeks later, another co-conspirator, Zacarias Moussaoui, was arrested on immigration charges in Minnesota after arousing suspicions at a flight school. But the dots were not connected, and Washington did not react.

Could the 9/11 attack have been stopped, had the Bush team reacted with urgency to the warnings contained in all of those daily briefs? We can’t ever know. And that may be the most agonizing reality of all.

Kurt Eichenwald, a contributing editor at Vanity Fair and a former reporter for The New York Times, is the author of “500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars.”


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Posted by: steveg

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 03:18 AM

Posted by: musicalmarv7

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 04:00 AM

I will never ever forget this day until I die.
Posted by: Jim_

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 08:12 AM

I'm not defending that administration by any means or lessening the severity of the situation, but hindsight is always 20/20.
Posted by: DLC

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 12:57 PM

But it just wasn't that briefing - in July 2001 they had threats of a plot to slam planes loaded with explosives into the G8 summit meeting in Genoa, Italy. Rice and GW and others discussed it in the Oval office of the WH !! Italy grounded ALL air traffic over Genoa for those 3 days. Still after this, the Aug 6th briefing didn't send warning bells off in their heads? Incompetence ! And the WTC had been a target before. They were either negligent or just plain unprepared... (read on vacation)... I'm amazed GW doesn't get more blame!
Posted by: lanovami

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 02:17 PM

I would be more forgiving if they hadn't used the occasion to do the things they did. One of many of those being Iraq. The article reads that bureacrats (Rumsfeld and other of his ilk) were more concerned about Saddam and his ilk. And even after the attack when they knew Saddam had no connection they made the petty and ultimately disastrous decision to go into Iraq of all places.

Iraq just had a series of bombing in one day that killed hundreds all because of imbalances and dysfunctionalities that we put into play.

Iraq played Japan yesterday in soccer. Though Japan needed the win to help get into the World Cup, I rooted for Iraq because the poor country needs some good news.
Posted by: NucleusG4

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 03:30 PM

Good observations Lano.
Posted by: carp

Re: Hind Sight 9/11 NYT - 09/11/12 06:15 PM

I am not defending Bush either - however up until the attack the WH was getting up to 1,000 threats a week, these help leads into the (cry wolf) syndrome.

IMO - The CIA was way way to general in their warnings.

Now this;

Zacarias Moussaoui, was arrested on immigration charges in Minnesota after arousing suspicions at a flight school. But the dots were not connected, and Washington did not react.

Not just Minnesota there was a flight school in Florida as well that reported suspicious students to the FBI. Maybe if the school called the CIA instead ? ? the dots would have then been connected - either way the disconnection between the CIA and the FBI , has created the Homeland Security.